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THE LLC VERSUS LLP CONUNDRUM: ADviCE FOR




In recent years the number of unincorporated entities offer-
ing limited liability and partnership taxation has increased
substantially.1 Among the newer choices, limited liability com-
panies ("LLCs") arrived on the scene first, with limited liability
partnerships ("LLPs") appearing a few years later as a serious
challenge to the LLC's domain.2 Alabama offers businesses the
* B.S., University of Alabama, 1995; J.D., University of Alabama, 1998; and
associated with the law firm of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, Ala-
bama. This Article grew out of an independent study project Ms. Stover completed
for Professor Hamill during her third year of law school.
** Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama. Professor Hamill
thanks Dean Kenneth Randall and her faculty colleagues for all of their support and
gratefully acknowledges the University of Alabama Law School Foundation, the Ed-
ward Brett Randolph Fund and the William H. Sadler Fund. Professor Hamill spe-
cially recognizes the students in the Fall 1997 and 1998 classes on LLCs and LLPs,
especially James Coomes, Wade Hartley, Rick McBride, John Donsbach, and Charles
Gorham, whose valuable classroom participation contributed greatly toward the un-
derstanding of the issues in this Article.
1. Unincorporated business organizations in Alabama include sole proprietor-
ships, general partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies. Corporations that have properly elected subchapter S
status are taxed as pass-through entities but face many restrictions not applicable to
partnerships. The restrictions faced by S corporations cause many businesses to
choose one of the many unincorporated business forms taxed under the partnership
provisions. See Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It Time to Give the S Corporation a Prop-
er Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 591, 624 (1996). A comparison of the complex business
and tax differences between S corporations and unincorporated businesses taxed as
partnerships is beyond the scope of this Article. See also ALA. CODE § 10-8A-101(5)
(Supp. 1998) (defining a partnership under Alabama law); id. § 10-8A-1001 (listing
the requirements for registering as a registered limited liability partnership); id.
§ 10-9B-101(9) (defining limited partnership under Alabama law); id. §§ 10-12-1 to
-61 (1994) (establishing the Alabama limited liability company).
2. See infra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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opportunity to use either a LLC' or a LLP, both of which pro-
vide the members or partners with the same limited liability
protection enjoyed by corporate shareholders.5 The LLC is a
3. The Alabama LLC Act was passed by the Senate on Apr. 22, 1993. S. 549,
165th Leg., Reg. Seas., 1993 S.J. Ala. 1293-94. The House of Representatives passed
the Act on May 17, 1993. H.R. 549, 165th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 H.R.J. Ala. 4141-
42. On May 17, 1993, both houses signed the bill. 1993 S.J. Ala. 2845-46; 1993
H.R.J. Ala. 4165-66. The Alabama LLC Act became effective on Oct. 1, 1993 after
being signed by Governor Jim Folsom on May 20, 1993. 1993 Ala. Acts 1425-60. It
is codified at title 10, chapter 12 of the Code of Alabama.
4. The LLP was adopted in Alabama with the adoption of the revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1996 (RUPA) by Act No. 96-528. The House of Representatives
passed RUPA on March 5, 1996. H.R. 184, 168th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1996 H.R.J. Ala.
624-25. The Senate passed RUPA on May 9, 1996. S. 184, 168th Leg., Reg. Sess.,
S.J. Ala. 234143. Both houses signed the bill on May 9, 1996. 1996 H.R.J. Ala.
3425; 1996 S.J. Ala. 2448-49. Alabama's version of RUPA, with an effective date of
Jan. 1, 1997, was signed by Governor Fob James on May 17, 1996. 1996 ALA. ACTS
685-738. It is codified at title 10, chapter 8A of the Code of Alabama. For broad
identification purposes, all references to RUPA in this Article will be to RUPA sec-
tion numbers rather than to the comparable Alabama statute. For an analysis of the
differences between RUPA and the version passed by Alabama, see General Statuto-
ry Note, 6 U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1998).
5. See RUPA § 306(c) (1996). The statutory language states:
[A] partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not personally liable
or accountable, directly or indirectly (including by way of indemnification, con-
tribution, assessment or otherwise), for debts, obligations and liabilities of, or
chargeable to, the registered limited liability partnership, or another partner
or partners, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise, solely by reason of
being such a partner....
Id.; ALA. CODE § 10-12-20 (1994). The statutory language states: "a member of a
limited liability company is not liable . . . for a debt, obligation, or liability of the
limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, or for the
acts or omissions of any other member, manager, agent, or employee of the limited
liability company." Id. § 10-2B-6.22. The statutory language states: "[n]either a sub-
scriber nor a shareholder of a corporation is personally liable for the acts or debts of
the corporation." Id.; see also 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN
& KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.04 (1996) (stating that the pres-
ence of limited liability protection will not shield a partner, member, or shareholder
from personal liability for their own negligent acts).
Like shareholders of corporations, both LLC and LLP owners should be subject
to the veil-piercing doctrine applicable to corporate shareholders because no valid
policy exists that supports treating LLCs and LLPs differently than corporations for
purposes of veil piercing. See Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual Responsibility in the
Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 348 (1998) (stating that "[tlhe
corporate veil-piercing doctrine will sometimes apply to LLCs because of their cha-
meleon-like nature"); Carol J. Miller, LLPs: How Limited Is Limited Liability?, 53 J.
Mo. B. 154, 159 (1997) (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14.3 (1994) in arguing that
"LLP partnerships should be subject to piercing the veil arguments under 'conditions
and circumstances under which the corporate veil' might be pierced"). Alabama,
814
1999] LLCs Versus LLPs 815
statutorily created new business form initially invented by inde-
pendent oil and gas explorers and later supported by a wide
variety of business activities.6 Wyoming enacted the first stat-
ute in 1977,' and more than ten years later, in 1988, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service finally recognized the LLC's ability to be
taxed like a partnership. By 1996 all fifty states had passed
legislation authorizing LLCs.9
The LLP is a general partnership that has registered to
provide all partners with limited liability protection."° Texas
enacted the first LLP statute in 1991 as a response to astronom-
ical losses threatening lawyers and accountants as a result of
their partners' involvement in the savings and loan crises of the
unlike some states, does not explicitly mention the corporate veil-piercing doctrine in
its LLC or LLP statutes. See Cohen-Whelan, supra, at 351-52 (discussing the inclu-
sion of the veil-piercing doctrine in some state LLC legislation). The Alabama Su-
preme Court has, however, given a list of the factors relevant in piercing the corpo-
rate veil. Simmons v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 554 So. 2d 398, 401 (Ala. 1989).
Specifically, it stated:
The corporate veil may be pierced where a corporation is set up as a subter-
fuge, where shareholders do not observe the corporate form, where the legal
requirements of corporate law are not complied with, where the corporation
maintains no corporate records, where the corporation maintains no corporate
bank account, where the corporation has no employees, where corporate and
personal funds are intermingled and corporate funds are used for personal
purposes, or where an individual drains funds from the corporation.
Simmons, 554 So. 2d at 401. The corporate veil may also be pierced "in the absence
of fraud, to prevent injustice or inequitable consequences." Barrett v. Odom, 453 So.
2d 729, 732 (Ala. 1984) (citing Cohen v. Williams, 318 So. 2d 279 (1975)).
6. For a complete outline of the chain of events leading to the LLC's birth and
subsequent rise, along with a broader historical analysis, see Susan Pace Hamill,
The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459 (1998).
7. Act of Mar. 4, 1977, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 512.
8. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; see Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Lia-
bility Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business, 41 U. FL&. L. REV. 721 (1989)
(an early article predicting the LLC's popularity); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375
(1992) (discussing early business and tax problems that confronted the LLC).
9. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing
the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MiCH. L. REV. 393 (1996) (concluding that the
creation and proliferation of LLCs was completely tax driven and providing extensive
statistical and legal analysis showing that the LLC imposes no material threat to
corporate tax revenues); see also id. at 400 n.28, 402 n.45, 403-04 nn.48-49 & 51-52
(documenting LLC statutes by year). Although this Article cites RUPA in reference
to LLPs, the Article will cite the LLC statutes adopted by the State of Alabama
because of the lack of uniformity among the states in adopting the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (ULLCA).
10. RUPA § 1001 (providing for registration with the probate judge).
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late 1980s." Subsequently, the number of states authorizing
LLP registration in their general partnership statutes grew
rapidly, and by 1999 all fifty states and the District of Columbia
had enacted statutes authorizing LLP registration. 2
11. Act of Aug. 26, 1991, § 84, 1991 Tex. Seas. Law Serv. 901 (West) (codified
at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (West Supp. 1995)); Robert W. Hamil-
ton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1995). The LLP as created by the Texas legislature, how-
ever, only protected partners from personal liability when the losses resulted from
the malpractice of another partner. All partners remained personally liable for part-
nership losses related to general business debts and torts unrelated to malpractice.
Hamilton, supra, at 1067. Soon after the enactment of the LLP in Texas, other state
legislatures passed statutes allowing businesses operating as general partnerships to
register as LLPs, and eventually the states started to offer LLP partners the full
limited liability protection enjoyed by corporate shareholders and LLC members and
managers. The partners enjoy full limited liability protection and, therefore, are not
personally liable for any of the partnership obligations, whether they arise in tort or
contract. Id. at 1066-67. When Alabama adopted RUPA in 1996, it included LLP
registration providing the same limited liability protection enjoyed by members of
Alabama LLCs and shareholders of Alabama corporations. ALA. CODE §§ 0-8A-
306(c), -1001 (Supp. 1998). Despite the narrow interest group motivations behind its
creation, the LLP has quickly evolved into a popular business form used by many
different kinds of businesses, far removed from law firm partners who fear draconian
personal liability for the malpractice of their partners.
12. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-1001 (Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.415 (Michie
1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-244 (West 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-42-703
(Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2.8.15049 (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7-64-1002 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-419 (West 1997);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544 (Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-160.1 (1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 620.78 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-62 (Supp. 1998);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425-153 (Michie Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 53-343A (Supp.
1998); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8.1 (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
4-1-45 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 486.44 (West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 56-345 (Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.555 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3482 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 801 (West
Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-1001 (Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, § 45 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 449.44 (West
Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323A.10-01 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 79-12-87 (Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 358.440 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-701 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-344 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 87.440 (Michie 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-A:44 (Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 42:1-44 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-44 (Michie 1996); N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-84.2
(Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-22-03 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1775.61 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 1-1002 (West
Supp. 1999); OIL REV. STAT. § 67.500 (Supp. 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8201
(West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-12-56 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-1110 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 48-7-108 (Michie Supp. 1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 61-1-143 (Supp. 1998); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08 (West
LLCs Versus LLPs
The LLC and LLP both derive their essential business char-
acteristics from partnership forms. The LLC represents an en-
tirely new business form in which the members can choose to
formally appoint managers, thus creating a manager-managed
LLC, which generally operates using a centralized management
structure much like a limited partnership. 3 If the members do
not appoint managers, the members, due to their statutory pow-
ers to bind and manage the LLC, strongly resemble ordinary
general partners in a general partnership.'4 The LLP remains
first and foremost a general partnership, the oldest and most
traditional business organization. 5 By vesting with all partners
or members the power to bind their respective entities and par-
ticipate in the management of the business, both LLPs and
member-managed LLCs share a common origin from the Uni-
form Partnership Act of 1914.16
Businesses contemplating a choice between the member-
managed LLC and the LLP will find the two business forms very
difficult to distinguish. Moreover, despite the limited partner-
ship-based centralized management structure, even manager-
managed LLCs can strongly resemble LLPs if the members use
the operating agreement to destroy the centralization of man-
agement. 7 Unlike limited partners of limited partnerships,"8 the
Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-42 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3291
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-43.1 (Michie 1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 25.05.500
(West Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE § 47B-10-1 (1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 178.40 (West
1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-1101 (Michie Supp. 1998).
13. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 (Supp. 1998). See generally Mitchel Hampton
Boles & Susan Pace Hamill, Agency Powers and Fiduciary Duties Under the Ala-
bama Limited Liability Company Act: Suggestions for Future Reform, 48 ALA. L.
REV. 143, 151-53 (1996).
14. ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 (Supp. 1998).
15. RUPA §§ 202, 1001-1010.
16. RUPA § 401(f); ALA. CODE § 10-12-22(a) (Supp. 1998); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 400-01 (1995) [hereinafter UPA] (codified in AiA. CODE § 10-8-
49(a) (1994) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 2001 and replaced by ALA. CODE § 10-8A-301
(Supp. 1998))).
17. ALA CODE § 10-12-24 (Supp. 1998) (explaining that the operating agreement
can broadly address any provisions regarding the affairs of the LLC). In order for a
manager-managed LLC to substantially resemble a member-managed LLC or a LLP,
the non-managers must assume substantial responsibilities related to the business.
See Boles & Hamill, supra note 13, at 157-58 (stating that if non-managing mem-
bers of manager-managed LLCs take on a "narrowly defined task with no continuity
of service," they remain special agents and, therefore, do not destroy the LLC's cen-
tralized management structure).
18. Limited partners in a limited partnership are not statutorily vested with the
1999] 817
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members of LLCs who are not managers possess complete free-
dom to acquire, through the operating agreement, an unlimited
amount of power to bind and participate in the business affairs
of the LLC."9 If the facts show that non-managing members are
participating heavily in the business, that particular manager-
managed LLC will, in fact, operate more like member-managed
LLCs and LLPs, despite the formal appointment of managers.0
Only manager-managed LLCs, in which the managers do, in
fact, retain most of the management powers thus staying close
to the limited partnership model, truly offer a business organiza-
tion choice that materially differs from the LLP on the broadest
power to bind the partnership or make business decisions concerning the partner-
ship. Limited partners are, in fact, penalized for attempting to take on too much re-
sponsibility in the partnership. If a limited partner gets too heavily involved in the
partnership's business, the law deems him to be a general partner, and he loses his
limited liability shield. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (1985), 6A
U.L.A. 144 (1995) [hereinafter RULPA].
The limited liability limited partnership ("LLLP") is the newest unincorporated
business organization which offers limited liability to all equity owners. States with
LLLP statutes allow the general partner, who in the traditional limited partnership
bore personal liability for debts of the entity, to enjoy as much liability protection as
the limited partners. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-62-403(2XaXII), (2XbXII) (1998).
Consequently, limited partners of LLLPs should not be concerned about assuming
substantial management responsibilities because being deemed a general partner will
not cause personal liability exposure.
19. ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1, -24 (Supp. 1998). Under agency law, at some point,
despite the presence of managers, non-managing members of LLCs assuming heavy
business responsibilities cross over from special agent to general agent status. Non-
managing members of LLCs that have become general agents are indistinguishable
from the managers who, by virtue of the LLC statute, automatically possess the
broad apparent authority of a general agent. See Boles & Hamill, supra note 13, at
156-60. Although pinpointing the cross-over point will be difficult, the greater duties
assumed by the non-manager combined with a closely held informal operational
scheme will increase the non-managing member's chances of being treated like a
general agent. Id.
20. Boles & Hamill, supra note 13, at 151-60. Manager-managed LLCs that op-
erate like member-managed LLCs and LLPs due to the high degree of business par-
ticipation by the non-managing members come with their own unique business issues
regarding the scope of the non-managing member's apparent authority to bind the
LLC. Member-managed LLCs, LLPs and traditional manager-managed LLCs can
more easily use the general and limited partnership precedents to define the scope
of apparent authority. Id. at 149, 151-53. However manager-managed LLCs may find
it difficult to predict the extent of a non-manager's apparent authority. Id at 154.
Once a non-managing member starts assuming business responsibilities, the apparent
authority protecting third parties can extend to the entire scope of the LLC's busi-
ness, remain focused on the business activities assumed, or end up somewhere in
between. Id. at 158-60.
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substantive level.2
This Article explores the legal distinctions and business
factors that lawyers should weigh when choosing between LLCs
and LLPs for their clients. Although LLPs and many LLCs ap-
pear to offer the same kind of business organization, both con-
tain a variety of technical differences buried in their respective
statutes that may materially affect certain businesses. The com-
bination of these technical differences, the goals of the particular
business, and the level of transaction costs available for business
planning will cause some businesses to be better off choosing the
LLC while others would have better results using the LLP. On a
comparative level, Part II of this Article focuses on the legal
rules in both the LLC and LLP statutes surrounding the man-
agement and fiduciary duty provisions, the dissociation and
dissolution provisions, and the economic sharing provisions for
allocating profits and losses. Despite the common general part-
nership roots behind the management and fiduciary duty provi-
sions of LLPs, member-managed LLCs, and many manager-
managed LLCs, several technical differences exist between the
LLC and LLP statutes. Although most of the technical differenc-
es are minor and, therefore, likely to be of no consequence, the
LLC's ambiguous voting standards, particularly related to salary
payments, may cause some difficulty for businesses using
LLCs'
Highlighting the significant technical differences in the LLC
and LLP statutes which materially affect a choice between the
two forms, Part II also discusses in detail the remaining two
substantive areas, dissociation and dissolution and profit and
loss sharing. RUPA preserves for the partners of LLPs the abso-
lute power to dissociate by voluntary act, guaranteeing each
individual partner some measure of liquidity in the partnership
interest.' The LLC statute contains no statutory dissociation
rights rendering members similar to shareholders of closely held
21. See generally Boles & Hamill, supra note 13; ALA. CODE § 10-9B-403 (Supp.
1998) (stating that general partners of limited partnerships have all of the powers of
a general partner in a general partnership); ALA. CODE § 10-9B-303 (Supp. 1998)
(providing for loss of the limited liability shield for any limited partner who "par-
ticipates in the control" of the limited partnership business).
22. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
23. RUPA § 602(a).
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corporations.' Consistent with the general partnership model,
LLP partners that fail to agree on profit and loss ratios share
profits equally and losses according to the profit ratio.' Recog-
nizing the existence of the limited liability shield, the LLP stat-
ute stops default loss allocations when the partner's capital
account reaches zero.2" If LLC members fail to agree on profit
and loss ratios, the default provision allocates both according to
the member's ratio of unreturned capital. Unlike the LLP,
which recognizes oral agreements," the LLC statute requires
that the operating agreement be in writing.' Consequently,
LLC members relying on an oral agreement to share profits may
end up with a smaller profit share than they bargained for."0
Drawing upon the legal distinctions discussed in Part II,
Part III analyzes the business factors lawyers should consider
when advising clients on whether to organize as a LLC or a
LLP. After briefly discussing the business scenarios in which the
LLC represents the clear choice, Part III then develops hypo-
thetical business scenarios to analyze whether the LLC or LLP
represents the more appropriate form for the many businesses
that will not automatically choose the LLC. The businesses
finding it most difficult to choose between the LLC and the LLP
include professional associations and small, active businesses
with a high level of owner participation.
The level of business planning available to the participants
and the relative sophistication of the business owners should be
the most important concerns when choosing between a LLC or a
LLP. If the business transaction will involve a great deal of
thought and planning and a detailed operating agreement, both
24. ALA. CODE § 10-12-30 (Supp. 1998) (denying dissociating LLC members any
rights to receive payment for their interest unless the articles of organization or the
operating agreement explicitly creates buy/sell provisions). See generally Laurel
Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama Limited Liability
Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909 (1998).
25. RUPA § 401(b).
26. RUPA § 306(c); see also infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing in detail the mechanics of RUPA's default loss allocations).
27. ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994).
28. RUPA § 101(6) & cmt. 2 (stating that "[t]he partnership agreement need not
be written; it may be oral or inferred from the conduct of the parties").
29. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998).
30. See id.; see also infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
820 [Vol. 50:3:813
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the LLP and the LLC will equally meet the client's goals. If the
business client cannot afford the transaction costs associated
with a detailed operating agreement, on the whole, the LLP will
better safeguard the participants' goals. Although member-man-
aged LLCs, manager-managed LLCs using a decentralized man-
agement structure, and LLPs offer essentially the same type of
business organization, if business participants who cannot afford
the transaction costs of careful planning choose the LLC, the
default provisions may result in negative consequences.
II. LEGAL COMPARISON OF MAJOR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
GOVERNING LLCs AND LLPs
A Agency Powers, Management and
Fiduciary Duties
Like traditional general partnerships, RUPA deems every
partner in a registered LLP to be a general agent of the partner-
ship for the purpose of conducting the partnership's business."
Consequently, even if an individual partner has no actual au-
thority to bind the partnership, agency law deems that partner
to have apparent authority regarding the entire scope of the
partnership's business.32 Third parties with no notice can rely
on that apparent authority even if an internal management
agreement denies the partner actual authority.' As previously
stated, member-managed LLCs vest in all members the same
agency powers enjoyed by LLP partners.'
31. RUPA § 301.
32. 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 4.02 (1998) (discussing RUPA's provisions addressing a partner's
ability to bind the partnership).
33. Id.
34. Compare ALA. CODE § 10-12-21 (Supp. 1998) (describing agency power of
members and managers in LLCs), with RUPA § 301 (setting out partners' agency
powers). RUPA makes two changes to the language of the UPA in the area of part-
ner agency. First, RUPA states that a partner's apparent authority extends beyond
the business of the particular partnership in question to acts for "carrying on in the
ordinary course ... business of the kind carried on by the partnership .. . ." RUPA
§ 301(1). The second difference is the allocation of risk for a partner's acts outside
his authority. The UPA states that only parties with knowledge of a restriction on a
partner's authority are bound by the restriction. UPA § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 400-01 (1995).
1999] 821
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Despite this seemingly identical treatment accorded LLPs
and member-managed LLCs, at least two minor technical differ-
ences may impact some businesses. RUPA explicitly provides
LLP partners limited options to alert third parties that certain
partners have no power to bind the partnership. If the partners
properly file a statement of authority specifying which partners
have no ability to deal in the partnership's real estate, third
parties conclusively are deemed to have constructive notice of
this limitation.' RUPA also allows for a notification procedure
to alert third parties that certain partners have no actual au-
thority to bind the partnership in all other business matters."
Unlike the statement of authority, which only requires a central
filing to cut off the apparent authority through constructive
notice, the notification procedure requires actual communication
with the third parties by complying with notification procedures
detailed in the statute."7 RUPA makes it clear that a partner's
apparent authority extends to acts for conducting "business of
the kind carried on by the partnership" and not just the particu-
lar business in which the partnership is involved.'
Alabama's LLC statute does not technically provide a mech-
anism to cut off a member's authority by filing a statement of
RUPA changes the UPA by allowing parties to be bound by the restriction as long
as they have received notification, regardless of whether the party had actual knowl-
edge of the restriction. RUPA § 301 cmt. 2. Notification is effective upon delivery.
Id-
35. RUPA § 303(e).
36. Id. § 301 cmt. 2.
37. Id. Even though RUPA's notification procedure does provide the partnership
with a method of limiting a partner's authority, the notification procedure may not
have much practical impact. The partnership is required to anticipate persons that a
partner may attempt to deal with and provide notification of the limitation on au-
thority prior to any attempts by the partner to deal with the third person. See id.
While it may be relatively easy to provide notification to persons the partnership
has dealt with in the past or is currently dealing with, it will be almost impossible
to notify all persons a partner could potentially deal with while conducting "business
of the kind carried on by the partnership." I&L § 301(1).
38. RUPA § 301 cmt. 2. Thus, it is difficult to cut off the authority of a partner
in a LLP. The method of limiting the authority of a LLP partner uses the operating
agreement to concentrate management power. In large, more complex partnerships
the operating agreement typically vests the authority to complete certain tasks with
designated committees. Although each partner's apparent authority still protects
third parties dealing with partners who are not on the committee, other internal
penalties such as expulsion will effectively discourage partners not on the committee
from violating the internal management structure.
822
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authority or complying with the notification procedure. The
appointment of managers represents the only avenue available
to cut off the members' agency powers. 9 Rather than reflecting
a major policy distinction between LLPs and member-managed
LLCs, this difference can be explained by historical evolution.
Alabama's LLC statute was modeled after the UPA,4° the gen-
eral partnership statute governing in 1993, which had no provi-
sions allowing statements of authority or notification.4' RUPA,
which became the law in Alabama in 1996, along with the LLP
registration alternative, first introduced these opportunities.'
The difference between the LLC and the LLP likely resulted
from oversight rather than intentional design. It would make
sense for the Alabama legislature to eliminate the disparity by
allowing LLC members the opportunity to file statements of
authority or comply with notification procedures.
The voting procedures for making managerial decisions
highlight other technical differences between LLCs and LLPs
that can cause problems for unsophisticated, informal businesses
operating as member-managed LLCs or manager-managed LLCs
that have reverted to a decentralized management structure.
RUPA specifically states that majority vote carries ordinary
decisions in the LLP while decisions "outside the ordinary course
of business" must be decided by unanimous vote." Although
the line distinguishing ordinary from extraordinary business
decisions will not always be clear, RUPA's default provisions
mandate that distributions, once declared, follow the partners'
39. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(b) (Supp. 1998) (providing that in manager-man-
aged LLC's, membership does not confer agency power).
40. Alabama's LLC statutes were effective in 1993 whereas the UPA was adopt-
ed in 1971.
41. See RUPA § 303 cmt. 1 (noting that the statement of authority provision
was added by RUPA).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 4010). Courts have held that extraordinary decisions include "changing
the form of the business entity and substantially altering the rights of the parties."
2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 32, at § 6.03(cX4) (citations omitted); see also
Thomas v. Marvin E. Jewell & Co., 440 N.W.2d 437 (Neb. 1989) (declaring that
unanimous consent was required to change the income distribution formula);
Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 144 A.2d 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958)
(involving a dispute over whether to incorporate a part of the partnership business);
Duell v. Hancock, 443 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. 1981) (discussing voting rights in the
context of admission of new partners).
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profit sharing ratio,' and no partner has the right to receive a
salary payment outside the profit sharing ratio.4 5 Because any
decision to change either of these rules must be agreed to by all
partners, the partnership voting standards provide valuable pro-
tection to minority partners against freeze-out techniques.'
The Alabama LLC Act's provisions addressing management
provide no explicit default rules dictating how to count the votes
(per capita or economic shares) or the percentage vote required
(majority or unanimity) to carry business decisions.47 Although
the commentary to subsections (a) and (b) of section 10-12-22 of
the Code of Alabama states that votes will be counted on a per
capita basis, meaning each member gets one vote, regardless of
disparities in their economic sharing arrangement, no language
in the statute or comment addresses the number of votes (major-
ity versus unanimity) required for the decision to go forward.'
44. RUPA § 401(b).
45. Id. § 401(h).
46. See id. (providing that partners are "not entitled to remuneration for servic-
es performed for the partnership"); see also Cagnolatti v. Guinn, 189 Cal. Rptr. 151,
157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that "the rule is '(a]bsent an express agreement, a
partner is not entitled to any compensation for his services to the partnership other
than his share of the profits') (citation omitted); J. WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP
LAW & PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 10.07 ("The general rule
against payment of partners in the absence of agreement is based on the concept
that partners receive payment for their services through their shares of partnership
profits.") (footnote omitted); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in
Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 505 (1995) (stating that
"[s]ection 18(f) of the UPA precludes partners from receiving salaries from the firm
without agreement of all the partners . . . "). The partnership statute does not clear-
ly state whether the decision to make any distributions is ordinary (majority vote) or
extraordinary (unanimous). Gevurtz, supra, at 504-05. However, once the partners
declare distributions, all partners have rights based on their profit percentage. ALA.
CODE § 10-SA-401(b) (Supp. 1998). Because partnerships statutorily guarantee all
partners the right to dissociate and withdraw their capital, as a practical matter,
disputes concerning distributions rarely arise. Gevurtz, supra, at 505; see also infra
notes 69-74 and accompanying text (discussing in detail dissociation from partner-
ships).
47. ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 (Supp. 1998). Although the amendments to the Ala-
bama LLC statute, effective January 1, 1998, explicitly allow the members to create
different classes of interests (which can be based on voting power), the general man-
agement rules still fail to set out voting rules when the members do not exercise
this option or otherwise address voting in the operating agreement. Id. § 10-12-22(c).
48. Id. § 10-12-22 cmt. (1994) (stating that the statute "adopts a default per
capita rule (because of potential problems of determining capital contributions, par-
ticularly in the sort of informal firms that are likely to adopt the default rule)r).
The 1998 amendment to section 10-12-22 adds specificity regarding the creation of
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Despite the absence of authority in the Alabama statutory lan-
guage, using RUPA by analogy, businesses operating as LLCs
can reasonably infer that ordinary decisions require a majority
vote while extraordinary decisions require a unanimous vote. If
every routine management decision required unanimity, busi-
ness would become unreasonably inefficient.49
The Alabama statute requires LLC operating agreements
(and all subsequent amendments) to be in writing and unani-
mously approved by all members." Distributions, once de-
clared, must follow the profit percentages unless all the mem-
bers agree to a different distribution scheme in the operating
agreement." While explicitly recognizing the ability of LLC
members to deal with the LLC as third parties, which would
include an employment relationship and the payment of sala-
ries, 2 the Alabama statute does not explicitly address salaries.
If salaries are more properly viewed as a subject for the operat-
ing agreement or an extraordinary business decision, all mem-
bers must authorize the payment.' On the other hand, if sala-
ries merely represent an ordinary business decision, arguably a
majority of the members can authorize the payment over the
different classes of members or managers in a LLC and does not affect the default
per capita voting rule as described in the original comment. Id. § 10-12-22 (Supp.
1998).
49. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 32, at § 6.03(cX2) ("A rule requir-
ing unanimity on all issues would impose substantial costs because of the inevita-
bility of disagreement on many issues.") (footnote omitted); but see J. BUCHANAN &
G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 85-96 (1962) (discussing the theory that
"the rational individual should always support the requirement of unanimous consent
before ... decisions are finally made" but that a departure from the unanimity rule
is rationalized by the introduction of decision-making costs).
50. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998).
51. Id. § 10-12-29. Although the statute clearly requires unanimity for distribu-
tions, once declared, to deviate from the profit percentage, the level of consent re-
quired to actually declare distributions remains unclear. If the decision whether to
make any distributions at all can be considered an ordinary business decision rather
than either an extraordinary decision or a subject for the operating agreement, then
a majority can authorize the distribution. See id. § 10-12-22 (1994). However all
members still must consent to a distribution scheme that varies from the profit
percentages. See supra note 46.
52. ALA. CODE § 10-12-19 (1994).
53. See id. § 10-12-22 (Supp. 1998); see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text (discussing partnership authorities which clearly state that decisions to autho-
rize salaries require unanimous approval).
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objection of other members.54
Business ventures that operate using a centralized manage-
ment structure by definition are organized with more formality
and, therefore, will probably address voting standards and sala-
ries explicitly in the operating agreement as part of the gover-
nance plan. Thus, the ambiguities in the LLC default provisions
related to voting standards and salary payments will rarely
cause problems for .manager-managed LLCs that adhere to the
centralized management plan. However, business participants
using LLCs without a carefully tailored governance scheme,
which will include many member-managed LLCs and manager-
managed LLCs operating with a decentralized structure, will
encounter more uncertainty in day-to-day operations than com-
parable businesses using LLPs.
As long as the number of participants remains relatively
small and the relationships remain harmonious, these differenc-
es between LLCs and LLPs should not cause any significant
problems. However, if the business participants experience a
falling out resulting in majority and minority factions, commonly
seen in close corporations, the uncertain rules concerning the
level of agreement necessary to authorize salary payments will
cause significant problems for minority members of LLCs.
As already stated, RUPA's unanimity standards for distribu-
tions and salaries protect minority partners of LLPs from freeze-
outs,55 while LLC members only enjoy similar protection from
distributions failing to follow the profit percentage." In the
common freeze-out fact pattern the majority group authorizes its
own salaries while excluding the minority members from similar
payment. If payment of salary can be classified as an ordinary
business decision, members of LLCs, who enjoy no statutory
rights to dissociate and withdraw their capital, will be as vulner-
able as close corporation shareholders to freeze-out tech-
niques.57
One can argue that salaries to LLC members represent an
54. Id.; see also Farrar & Hamill, supra note 24, at 924; infra notes 62 & 63
(discussing corporate authorities which clearly state that decisions to authorize
salaries require only majority approval).
55. RUPA § 401(h), (G).
56. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994).
57. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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important consideration that either must be covered by the oper-
ating agreement or at least rise to the level of being an ex-
traordinary business decision. Many LLCs strongly resemble
general partnerships covered by RUPA, and RUPA explicitly
requires all partners to agree to salary payments.' Moreover,
LLC operating agreements must be agreed upon unanimously,59
and distributions varying from the profit percentage must meet
the unanimous threshold of the operating agreement."
On the other hand, the LLC statute, unlike RUPA, does not
mention salaries, and the LLC distribution provisions address
profits only, which would support classifying salary as an ordi-
nary management decision rather than a subject that must
appear in the operating agreement. Unless the Alabama legisla-
ture amends the LLC statute to deal with the salary question,
majority members of LLCs will likely assume that they can
validly authorize salaries, forcing the courts to interpret the
statute after the minority members experience a freeze-out and
sue.
Under their respective statutes, LLP partners and members
of member-managed LLCs owe the same fiduciary duties to each
other.6 Reflecting the general decentralized management struc-
ture and the mutual dependence on each other, all LLP partners
and all LLC members owe to each other the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care.62 Like general partners of limited partner-
58. RUPA § 401(h), Gi).
59. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998).
60. See i& § 10-12-28 (1994).
61. Compare ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(e) (Supp. 1998), with RUPA § 404. The new-
ly amended Alabama LLC Act places the same fiduciary duties on members of mem-
ber-managed LLCs as RUPA places on LLP partners. See Boles & Hamill, supra
note 13, at 160-71 (outlining suggested fiduciary duty statutory provisions as well as
needed commentary and examples).
62. Compare ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(e) (Supp. 1998), with RUPA § 404. RUPA
differs from the UPA in this area in that the UPA did not extensively define the
partners' fiduciary duties in the statutory provisions. The UPA, instead, left detailed
development of those duties to the common law of agency. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1.
RUPA § 404(b) limits a partner's duty of loyalty to the following: (1) accounting to
the partnership and holding as trustee any property, profit or benefit the partner
derives through the conduct or winding up of the business, use of the partnership's
property, or through appropriation of an opportunity of the partnership; (2) refrain-
ing from dealing with the partnership on behalf of a person with an adverse interest
to the partnership whether it be in the conduct or the winding up of partnership
business; and (3) refraining from competing with the partnership prior to its dissolu-
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ships, in the manager-managed LLC structure generally only
the managers owe fiduciary duties.' In a pure centralized man-
agement structure, fiduciary duties are only appropriately im-
posed on those who are depended upon to run the business.
Under the LLC statute, if non-managing members acquire au-
thority related to the business through the operating agreement,
those non-managers owe fiduciary duties commensurate with
their management powers." The more management authority
acquired by the non-managing members, the greater the level of
fiduciary duties owed.' If the non-managing members of man-
tion. RUPA § 404(b). The LLP partner's duty of care only requires the partner to
avoid "engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of [the] law" while conducting or winding up the business of the
partnership. RUPA § 404(c). Despite the fact that the LLP partner only has the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, the partner is required to carry out those duties
and all other duties imposed by RUPA consistent "with the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing." RUPA § 404(d).
Although RUPA allows the partners to alter the default fiduciary rules, "nei-
ther the fiduciary duties of loyalty or care, nor the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing, may be eliminated entirely." RUPA § 103 cmt. 4. The statute explicitly
states that the partnership agreement may identify activities which do not violate
the duty of loyalty. RUPA § 103(bX3Xi). The partners may also ratify, "after full
disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would
violate the duty of loyalty." RUPA § 103(bX3Xii). The fiduciary duties listed in the
newly amended Alabama LLC Act are identical to those listed in RUPA. Compare
RUPA § 404, with ALA. CODE § 10-12-21 (Supp. 1998).
63. AiA. CODE § 10-12-21(e), (kX2) (Supp. 1998); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 409(hX2) (1995) [hereinafter ULLCA]. General partners of limited partnerships owe
fiduciary duties similar to those owed by partners of general partnerships. See ALA.
CODE § 10-9B-1205 (Supp. 1998) (providing that the Alabama Uniform Partnership
Act of 1996 applies to any issue not specifically covered by the Alabama Limited
Partnership Act of 1997); id. § 10-9B-403(a) (stating that "a general partner of a
limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a
partner in a partnership without limited partners"); CALLISON, supra note 46,
§ 21.07 (citing RULPA § 403(a) (1985) (providing that "a general partner of a limit-
ed partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a
partner in a partnership without limited partners")); Sandra K. Miller, What Stan-
dard of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability Com-
panies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 21, 51-52 (1994) (stating that fiduciary duties owed
by general partners in limited partnerships are the same as those owed by partners
in a general partnership); see also Boles & Hamill, supra note 13, at 165 (discussing
fiduciary duties of managers, general partners and corporate directors).
64. ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(kX3) (Supp. 1998).
65. A member of a manager-managed LLC who takes on some managerial du-
ties owes fiduciary duties on a "sliding scale." The member is held to the fiduciary
standards imposed on managers "to the extent that the member exercises the mana-
gerial authority vested in a manager." Id.; see ULLCA § 409(hX3), 6A U.L.A. 465
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ager-managed LLCs participate in the business to a great extent
causing them, in substance, .to resemble partners of LLPs or
members of member-managed LLCs, under the Alabama LLC
Act these members will owe commensurate fiduciary duties."
B. Dissociation and Dissolution
The LLP and LLC statutes offer radically different provi-
sions addressing the rights of individual partners or members to
dissociate and withdraw their capital from the LLP or LLC.
RUPA statutorily guarantees all partners in a LLP the power to
dissociate by voluntary withdrawal, even if the act of dissoci-
ating constitutes wrongful conduct, 7 while the LLC statute
provides no dissociation rights. LLC members that want the
rights to withdraw from the LLC and secure payment from the
LLC or other members must bargain for those rights, often re-
ferred to as buy/sell agreements, in advance." These con-
trasting approaches to business-exit rights, based squarely on
partnership law in the case of the LLP and on corporation law
in the case of the LLC, represent the most significant difference
between the LLP and LLC.
Partners of LLPs enjoy dissociation rights beyond the power
to voluntarily withdraw from the partnership.69 RUPA contains
an elaborate web of rules spelling out other occurrences, such as
death or bankruptcy, that cause dissociation, resulting either in
a buyout of the dissociated partner's interest or in the dissolu-
tion of the partnership.7 -Partnerships for a particular term or
(1995).
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Boles & Hamill, supra
note 13, at 167-68 (suggesting that manager-managed LLCs operating like a closely
held business should more easily acquire fiduciary duty obligations under the sliding
scale); Boles & Hamill, supra note 13, at 171 (arguing that fiduciary duties imposed
on managers of widely held LLCs operating as traditional corporations should mirror
corporate law).
67. RUPA § 602.
68. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-36 (Supp. 1998). Under the Alabama LLC Act, unless
the operating agreement provides that a member may not withdraw from the LLC,
a member may withdraw from the LLC, and thereby terminate all fiduciary duties
and other obligations of membership. Id. However, the statutory default provision
provides no rights of economic payment to a withdrawing member. Id.




undertaking potentially dissolve upon all events of wrongful
dissociation, such as voluntary withdrawal, bankruptcy, or judi-
cial expulsion before the- end of the term or undertaking." If a
majority-in-interest of the non-dissociating partners votes to
continue the partnership, no dissolution occurs; instead, the
partnership will redeem the interests of the dissociated partner
and any other partner choosing not to continue.72 By contrast,
if the partnership has no specified term or undertaking, com-
monly referred to as a partnership at will, only a partner's vol-
untary withdrawal triggers a dissolution, and thereafter each
partner has the right to demand a judicial sale." RUPA pro-
vides no mechanism to avoid the dissolution by continuing the
existing partnership. All other dissociation events simply trigger
buyout rights for the departing partner.74
RUPA allows LLPs great flexibility to craft customized
agreements addressing dissociation rights and dissolution of the
partnership, but this flexibility is not unlimited. The partners
can eliminate all dissolution triggers, explicitly set out their own
rules defining wrongful and non-wrongful dissociations, and
even eliminate the buyout rights associated with most of the
dissociation events.' Despite this enhanced flexibility which did
not exist under the Uniform Partnership Act,"6 RUPA preserves
71. Id. § 801.
72. Id. §§ 601, 701, 801.
73. Id. § 801(1) & cmt. 3.
74. RUPA §§ 603, 701.
75. Id. § 103. RUPA's default provision technically dissolving the partnership
upon a partner's withdrawal is prompted by the concept of lingering liability. Farrar
& Hamill, supra note 24, at 920. This concept is based on the idea that a departing
partner may not feel comfortable allowing the entity to continue to exist for fear
that situations may arise in which it will be difficult to determine whether the part-
nership incurred a particular liability before or after the partner's dissociation. Id.
(citing 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 5, at §§ 11.14 & 11.16 (arguing that a
partner should have the ability to dissolve the entity in order to cut off lingering
personal liability)). Because the LLP possesses the corporate veil of limited liability,
lingering liability should not be a consideration for departing partners. Therefore,
partners of LLPs concerned about the instability often resulting from a judicial sale
should consider adopting a partnership agreement that eliminates all dissolution
triggers. Even if a liability were incurred prior to the partner's departure, his per-
sonal assets will not be at risk because of the presence of the limited liability
shield. See RUPA § 401.
76. The UPA § 29 provides that a partnership is dissolved any time a partner
leaves. RUPA § 801 cmt. 1. Consequently, the following events lead to dissolution of
a partnership under the UPA: (1) end of a definite term; (2) accomplishment of a
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the absolute power of each partner to dissociate by voluntary
act." Although the creation of a term or undertaking will make
these dissociations wrongful, thus subjecting the withdrawing
partner to financial penalties, the partnership agreement cannot
eliminate the basic power to dissociate.7'
As already noted and in contrast to partners in a LLP, LLC
members possess no statutory rights to dissociate and withdraw
their capital from the LLC. LLC members that wish to create
dissociation and buyout rights must negotiate buy/sell
agreements.79 Because a majority of members arguably can au-
thorize salary payments to themselves while leaving out the
minority members, LLC members who fail to plan ahead by
contracting for buyout rights run the same risk of being sub-
particular undertaking, (3) expulsion of a partner pursuant to the partnership agree-
ment; (4) a partner's withdrawal by express will; and (5) by operation of law (includ-
ing death or bankruptcy of a partner or the partnership business becoming unlaw-
ful). UPA § 29, 6 U.LAL 752 (1995). After dissolution, partnerships under the UPA
are wound up and terminated. UPA § 30. Only those partners who have not wrong-
fully caused dissolution of the partnership are allowed to participate in winding up
the partnership. Id. § 37.
77. RUPA § 103(bX6) & cmt.
78. Under RUPA, a dissociation is wrongful if: (1) it is in breach of the part-
nership agreement, or (2) the partner withdraws by express will, is judicially ex-
pelled, becomes bankrupt, or willfully dissolved or terminated before the expiration
of the term or completion of the undertaking in a partnership for a term or particu-
lar undertaking. RUPA § 602(b). RUPA provides many consequences for wrongful
dissociation. For example, section 602(c) makes the wrongfully dissociating partner
liable for damages. ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILiTY
PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT 210 (1996). In term
partnerships, section 602(bX2Xi) allows the other partners to withdraw within ninety
days after a partner wrongfully dissociates. Id. Section 803(a) prohibits the wrongful-
ly dissociating partner from participating in the winding up of the partnership busi-
ness. Id. If the partnership is for a particular term, a wrongful dissociation will
result in the dissolution and winding up of the partnership unless a majority-in-
interest of the partners agrees to continue the partnership within ninety days of the
wrongful dissociation. Id.
79. ALA. CODE § 10-12-36 (Supp. 1998). Until 1996, LLCs needed to remain
technically dissolvable in order to lack continuity of life under the partnership classi-
fication regulations for federal taxpayers. The Internal Revenue Service's promulga-
tion of the check-the-box regulations making all LLCs automatically taxable as part-
nerships eliminated the need for the organization to lack continuity of life, thus
allowing state legislatures for the first time to consider eliminating all statutory
dissolution and dissociation rights. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4 (as amended by
T.D. 8697 (1996)); see infra text accompanying notes 115-17 (explaining that the
elimination of all dissociation rights in the LLC statute was driven by federal gift
and estate tax considerations).
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jected to squeeze-out techniques commonly experienced by
shareholders of closely held corporations.' Like minority share-
holders of close corporations, these LLC members will have to
prove a high level of wrongful conduct by the majority share-
holders for a court to provide a remedy. LLCs whose members
are least likely to bargain ahead of time concerning buyout
rights will often be smaller, less sophisticated businesses using a
member-managed or a manager-managed LLC structure that
substantively resembles a LLP at the broadest level. Moreover,
the LLC statute contains no oppression remedies similar to
those found in corporation statutes, and the common law has not
yet addressed whether minority LLC members can invoke the
same remedies available to shareholders of close corporations."1
Even if all close corporation remedies ultimately apply to minor-
ity LLC members by analogy, the corporate protection for the
individual member falls far short of the partnership protections
offered to the individual partner."2
Moreover, the opportunity for LLC participants to draft a
buy/sell agreement will often serve as a poor substitute for the
statutory dissociation rights that benefit all partners of LLPs.
Because all rights under the buy/sell agreement must be defined
in the contract, member-managed LLCs and manager-managed
LLCs operating under a decentralized management structure
that cannot afford substantial transaction costs may find it pro-
hibitively expensive to create a well-drafted buy/sell agreement
that adequately covers all the important issues. For example, a
well-drafted buy/sell agreement should address events triggering
the obligation to purchase as well as a valuation of the business
interest in order to set the buyout price. A business's fair mar-
ket value will change over time, thus creating the need to re-
value the business periodically.' A poorly drafted buy/sell
agreement that fails to adequately value the business on a peri-
odic basis or contemplate unforeseen departures can cause more
80. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 24, at 923-24.
81. Id. at 925-27.
82. Id. at 929-34.
83. The dissociation provisions under RUPA provide for a valuation method (the
greater of going concern or liquidation) and value the departing partner's interest at
the time of dissociation, thus eliminating any need to periodically revalue the part-
nership. See RUPA § 701(b) & cmt. 3.
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harm than good.' Manager-managed LLCs, which operate in
the same manner as limited partnerships," will normally be
able to afford the transaction costs to produce a well-drafted
buy/sell agreement. However, members of many other LLCs at-
tempting to draft buy/sell agreements without incurring the
transaction costs necessary to cover all the issues may find
themselves receiving woefully inadequate payment for their
interests or being involuntarily ousted from the business.
C. Economic Sharing
The statutory provisions outlining how LLP partners and
LLC members share profits and losses contain technical differ-
ences that may materially affect the business participants'
choice between a LLP and a LLC, especially when focusing on
the profits.' If the partnership agreement in the LLP fails to
address profit allocations, the default provisions of RUPA pro-
vide for an equal sharing ratio, regardless of the partners' capi-
tal accounts."7 RUPA's equal profit ratio derives its roots from
early partnership law which assumed that partners join together
84. In order to fully compensate the departing member, the buy/sell agreement
should contain a provision for periodic revaluation of shares. If the business is small
and unsophisticated, it is unlikely that the members will have either the time or the
expertise to intermittently value LLC interests. A poorly drafted buy/sell agreement
can produce disastrous results for the departing member because courts are reluctant
to interfere with such agreements based on unfair price. See, e.g., Concord Auto
Auction v. Rustin, 627 F. Supp. 1526, 1529-30 (D. Mass. 1986) (refusing to order
revaluation of shares upon a shareholder's untimely death where absolute responsi-
bility of survivors to revalue was not clear); Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136,
137-38 (N.Y. 1989) (enforcing a buy/sell agreement triggered upon a shareholder's
termination of employment under circumstances where the majority shareholders ter-
minated the employment right before a higher share valuation would have applied;
minority shareholder received $89,000 under a book value formula instead of
$3,000,000 under a more accurate valuation formula which was scheduled to go into
effect less than a month after the minority shareholder's employment was terminat-
ed); Evangelista v. Holland, 537 N.E.2d 589, 593 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (stating that
the idea that "[t/he price established by a stockholders' agreement may be less than
the appraised or market value is unremarkable").
85. An example of such an agreement can be found at 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE,
supra note 5, app. A.
86. Compare RUPA § 401(b), with ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994).
87. RUPA § 401(b).
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as co-proprietors principally contributing services." Because
RUPA recognizes oral partnership agreements and amendments
as long as they are enforceable under contract principles, 9 and
because most business participants at least discuss profits, few
LLP partners will need to use the default provision to establish
their profit sharing ratio."
Unlike the LLP statute, the default provision of the Ala-
bama LLC Act explicitly requires all operating agreements to be
in writing.9' Oral amendments are likewise unenforceable un-
less the written operating agreement provides for oral amend-
ments to it.92 Consequently, LLC members who rely on oral
agreements to establish their profit sharing ratio may find their
agreement unenforceable. If the members fail to enter into an
enforceable agreement for sharing profits, the statutory default
provision allocates profits in the LLC in the same ratio that the
members share contributions made that have not been
returned.' Thus, if a member only contributes services, that
member runs a substantial risk of being denied a share of the
LLC's profits under the default rule.' Under these circum-
88. See UPA § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995).
89. Partnership law recognizes these oral agreements in order to validate and
protect informal business arrangements that often organize as partnerships. RUPA
§ 101(6) & cmt. 2 (stating explicitly that oral partnership agreements are effective).
90. RUPA § 101(6). Due to the problems that may exist with proving the exis-
tence of an oral agreement and its contents, well-advised LLP partners will memori-
alize their profit sharing ratio in writing. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note
32, § 6.02(bXl) (stating that in the absence of an agreement, partners share profits
equally regardless of whether capital or services were contributed unequally).
Bromberg and Ribstein note that
general partners in the sort of informal, closely held general partnership that
does not have a customized agreement are usually "jacks of all trades," mak-
ing a variety of contributions, including expertise and labor . . . and credit
(that is, the ability to borrow money and the risk of personal liability). The
partners' profit shares are intended to compensate for all of these contribu-
tions.
Id. (citing Stella v. Government Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 663 F.2d 326 (1st Cir.
1981)).
91. AiLA CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998). Approximately one-third of the states
require the operating agreement to be in writing; the rest of the states recognize
oral agreements. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 5, app. 4-1, at 30.
92. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998).
93. Id. § 10-12-28 (1994).
94. Id. Because the technical language establishing the default profit sharing
ratio refers to each member's "value of contributions," id. § 10-12-28, while services
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stances, if the members contributing capital fail to acknowledge
the oral agreement, the member contributing services may be
forced to ask a court to recognize the oral agreement under a
theory of unjust enrichment or some other equitable doctrine
available under state law.'
The requirement that all operating agreements be in writing
combined with the default profit sharing ratio will most likely
cause unforeseen problems for small, informal businesses orga-
nized as member-managed LLCs or manager-managed LLCs
operating under a decentralized structure-the same kind of
business that often appears indistinguishable from the LLP.
These business participants will often rely on oral agreements to
share profits or assume they all have an equal sharing ratio.
However, a larger, more complex business, operating as a tradi-
tional manager-managed LLC will generally incur the necessary
transaction costs to negotiate a detailed written operating agree-
ment.'
Compared to the statutory default provisions governing the
profit ratio, the provisions concerning loss allocation ratios of
LLCs and LLPs contain only minor differences. If the LLC mem-
bers or the LLP partners fail to agree on how they bear losses,
both statutes ensure that no member or partner will become
personally liable to make contributions solely due to a default
loss allocation. The rules governing loss allocations of LLCs are
much easier to administer as a practical matter. Regardless of
how the members of a LLC share profits, if they fail to agree on
are explicitly identified as a contribution for which the member must pay the cash
value if the member fails to perform, id. §§ 10-12-26, -27, one can argue that a ser-
vice-contributor's profit ratio is based on the value of the service contributed. Al-
though valuing the services may be difficult and may still produce a smaller profit
share than the oral agreement, this argument may produce a stronger case for the
service- contributor than the traditional equity remedies under contract law. Because
the valuation of the services would only be to establish the service-contributor's
percentage share of future profits and would in no event grant a current right to
capital, the service-contributing member will generally recognize no taxable income
until profits are earned and allocated. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. Profes-
sor Hamill acknowledges the student in the Fall 1998 LLC class (exam no. 547) who
came up with this argument in a well-written exam answer.
95. Id. § 10-12-24 (Supp. 1998). For an alternative argument, see the discussion
in supra note 94.
96. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 5, app. A-23 & A-36 for an exam-
ple of a standard profit sharing agreement.
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a loss sharing ratio, the statute allocates losses according to
their ratio of unreturned capital in the LLC.97 With LLCs,
these pro rata loss allocations will simultaneously reduce all
members' positive capital accounts.'
If partners in a general partnership or a LLP fail to agree
on how to bear losses, RUPA allocates losses in the same ratio
as the partners share profits." If a general partnership has not
registered to be a LLP, the default loss ratio can create personal
liability to satisfy another partner's positive capital account, if,
for example, the partners contribute capital in unequal ratios
but share profits equally. Under these facts, the allocation of
losses equally under the statute will reduce the account of the
partner contributing less capital to a negative number while the
other partner's account will remain positive."° If the partner-
ship has a LLP registration in effect, the default loss allocations
still generally follow the ratio for sharing profits; however, once
the losses bring a particular partner's capital account to zero,
that partner cannot receive any more loss allocations.'" Any
additional losses must be allocated to any remaining partners
with positive capital account balances. 2
The difference between the default loss allocations in the
LLC and LLP statutes will most often have significance when
97. ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994).
98. If no LLC member has a positive capital account but the LLC still shows
losses that year, the only possible source of money creating those losses is borrowed
funds. Because of the limited liability shield provided by the LLC filing, no member
or manager can be held personally liable to pay the creditor absent an affirmative
agreement, such as the execution of a guarantee. Id. § 10-12-20 (1994). Losses at-
tributable to liabilities for which no member bears the economic risk of loss are only
significant for tax purposes and are beyond the scope of this Article.
99. RUPA § 401(b).
100. See RUPA § 401(aX2). Under fact patterns where the partners failed to
agree to a loss sharing ratio, case law decided under the UPA sometimes created
equitable exceptions relieving a partner from the responsibility of making a capital
contribution to satisfy another partner's positive capital account. See, e.g., Kovacik v.
Reed, 315 P.2d 314 (1957). RUPA's default loss allocation ratio clearly follows profits
even if the lost allocation creates an obligation to restore another partner's positive
capital account. Consequently, the equitable exceptions under UPA law carry sub-
stantially less weight in states that have adopted RUPA. RUPA § 401 cmt. 3.
101. See RUPA § 306(c).
102. RUPA §§ 306(b), 807(b); see supra note 98 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing negative capital accounts created from losses attributable to borrowed funds; the
treatment of LLP partners receiving loss allocations when no partner shows a pos-
itive capital account is the same as LLC members).
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the business venture involves some participants contributing
primarily capital while the other participants contribute primar-
ily services, and the participants fail to discuss losses. For exam-
ple, if the partners of a LLP have interests in capital reflecting a
seventy percent, twenty percent, and ten percent ratio but agree
to share profits equally, the initial loss allocations under the
default provision will follow the profit ratio-one-third of all
losses for each partner." However, once the partner with an
initial ten percent capital interest shows a capital account of
zero, the losses must be allocated to the remaining two partners
who still have positive capital accounts. At that point, only the
partners still showing positive capital accounts can receive addi-
tional losses by default.' Once the partner with an initial
twenty percent capital interest shows a capital account of zero,
the losses must be allocated to the only remaining partner with
a positive capital account, the partner who initially contributed
seventy percent of the capital."' 5 If the hypothetical business in
the above example were operated as a LLC, the loss allocations
under the default rules would simply follow the members' ratio
of unreturned capital-seventy percent, twenty percent, and ten
percent--causing the members' capital accounts to reach zero at
the same time and rendering the complex re-allocations under
the LLP model unnecessary."c
The differences between the default loss allocation rules of
LLCs and LLPs boil down to timing. In both entities, the default
loss allocation rules will eventually reduce all positive capital
accounts to zero but can never singlehandedly create an obliga-
tion to make contributions to the LLC or LLP. However, depend-
103. RUPA § 401(b).
104. See RUPA § 306(c).
105. In this hypothetical, once the ten-percent capital contributor can no longer
receive loss allocations, the remaining losses must be allocated between the two
partners who still have positive capital accounts. Under the facts, each of these two
partners is entitled to one-third of the profits, but each has a different ratio of unre-
turned capital. Because RUPA technically requires all losses to follow profits and
only forces a re-allocation to prevent a zero capital account from becoming a deficit,
the remaining losses should be allocated equally (reflecting that each of the two
remaining partners have a one-third profit interest; with respect to each other, each
has an equal claim to the partnership's profits) until one of the partner's capital
account reaches zero.
106. ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994).
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ing on the individual business participant's capital contribution
and share of profits, the default loss allocations will either more
slowly or more quickly reduce that person's capital account un-
der the LLC or LLP rules. Under RUPA, partners with a larger
share of profits and smaller share of capital will receive a great-
er percentage of losses, causing their capital account to reach
zero faster; partners with a smaller share of profits and a larger
share of capital will receive a lesser percentage of losses, causing
their capital account to reach zero more slowly."°7 The loss al-
location rules for LLCs create an opposite effect. Members with
larger capital accounts receive a greater percentage of losses
than members with smaller capital accounts. Because the loss
allocation percentage mirrors the capital accounts, the LLC
members' accounts will reach zero at the same time."°
III. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE LLC AND LLP ON
A PRACTICAL LEVEL
While the LLP and LLC are similar in many respects and
often difficult to distinguish, there are many situations in which
the LLC clearly represents the better choice for a business. As
noted above, because the LLP offers no statutory mechanism for
formally centralizing management, the manager-managed LLC
will be the best choice when the participants truly desire a cen-
tralized management structure. Such businesses include high-
risk, leveraged real estate or natural resource ventures and
other businesses in which the majority of the capital is contrib-
uted by passive investors." Before the LLC became available,
virtually all of these businesses were conducted in the limited
partnership form. Any such business that traditionally would
have operated as a limited partnership"0 should choose the
107. RUPA § 401(b).
108. AL.A CODE § 10-12-28 (1994).
109. See Terrence Floyd Cuff, California Limited Liability Company Act, 374
PRAC. L. INST. TAX 9, 46 (1995); Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies: Fea-
tures and Uses, 869 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. 275, 281 (1994).
110. Alabama allows registration as a limited partnership for almost any purpose.
See ALA. CODE §§ 10-9B-101 to -1206 (Supp. 1998) (providing for registration as a
limited partnership in Alabama); see also Hamill, supra note 9, at 426 (stating that
"[m]ost nonpublicly traded limited partnerships have been used for real estate and
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manager-managed LLC instead of the LLP. Because these in-
vestment-oriented business ventures typically engage in ade-
quate business planning, including having a detailed operating
agreement, the potential traps hidden in the LLC default provi-
sions should not cause any negative effects for these businesses.
These potential traps include the ambiguous standard for autho-
rizing salaries,"' the writing requirement for operating agree-
ments,"2 the default profit sharing ratio,"3 and the absence
of dissociation rights.""
The LLC is also the better choice for family businesses
where the participants have estate and gift tax planning as a
major goal. Apparently, the goal of making LLCs suitable for gift
and estate tax planning for family businesses constituted a ma-
jor reason for eliminating dissociation rights in the LLC stat-
ute." 5 In order to qualify for discounted valuation for gifts and
bequests among family members, the business interest, pursu-
ant to federal law, must be nontransferable and non-liquid as a
matter of state law."6 Therefore, because LLPs preserve the
absolute right of the partners to dissociate and have their inter-
ests redeemed by the partnership, LLP interests will never qual-
ify for discounted valuation if transferred among family mem-
bers in the gift and estate tax context."7 Because estate plan-ning normally involves a fair amount of legal advice, family
businesses that choose LLCs, in order to qualify for discounted
valuation of gifted or bequeathed interests, will not likely be
caught by the traps hidden in the LLC's default provisions.
The third type of business for which the LLC is clearly the
better choice is one in which the participants desire a business
form as close to the corporate structure as possible. Often these
other investment ventures"); Hamill, supra note 9, at 427 (stating that "limited part-
nerships have on balance been investment-oriented arrangements designed to pro-
duce, when the economics of the investment interface with the tax rules, tax loss-
es").
111. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
112. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998).
113. Id. § 10-12-28 (1994); see also supra notes 50-54, 91-96 and accompanying
text.
114. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 79.
116. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 24, at 934-38.
117. Id. at 934-40.
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will include small, active businesses or joint ventures that want
a formal centralized management structure, even if they use the
operating agreement to undercut it." 8 Often these businesses
desire the corporate form to avoid the liquidity problems that
sometimes result from dissociation rights or simply for the in-
tangible reason of familiarity. Corporations have been around
since America's beginnings, and for most of the twentieth centu-
ry they have held their place as the dominant business form." 9
The LLC represents the most logical choice for such businesses
because the Alabama LLC, with the elimination of dissociation
rights and the presence of capital-based economic sharing de-
fault rules, more closely resembles a corporation than any other
business form.
Conversely, the LLP probably represents the preferred
choice for business participants who have traditionally used
general partnerships. Law and accounting firms are the prime
examples of entities that have historically organized as general
partnerships, thus making them good candidates for LLP
registration. Typically, these firms make an effort to centralize
management through the use of internal management commit-
tees. The fact that such internal governance rules do not affect
third parties has not been a concern of law firms and other pro-
fessional organizations. Usually law firms do not experience the
problems that arise when a partner conducts transactions be-
yond the scope of his authority. Sophisticated expulsion agree-
ments will normally discourage partners from violating the in-
ternal management committee structure agreed upon. As a re-
sult, there is no need for these firms and other professional
organizations, which customarily organize as general partner-
ships, to move to an entirely new business form. The expecta-
tions of the owners make the LLP, which is, in effect, a general
partnership, the better choice. 20
118. See Robert R. Keatinge, Corporations, Unincorporated Organizations, and
Unincorporations: Check the Box and the Balkanization of Business Organizations, 1
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 201, 237-41 (1997).
119. See generally Hamill, supra note 6 (discussing the development of corpora-
tions in American history).
120. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Limited Liability Law Practice, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 359 (1998) (discussing the use of LLPs for law firms); ALA. CODE § 10-8A-1010
(Supp. 1998) (providing professionals the opportunity to register as a LLP); see also
1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 5, § 2.23 (stating that "some professionals have
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Unsophisticated businesses that either cannot afford the
transaction costs of completing an elaborate operating agree-
ment or have not even considered entering into a written agree-
ment will typically be better off choosing the LLP. Such busi-
nesses include those that consist of a small amount of capital
and few participants, all or most of whom are heavily involved
in the business. Some owners may contribute services to the
business because they are unable to contribute capital. The
prototype of this business encompasses the classic closely held
corporation.
The closely held corporation evolved during the last half of
the twentieth century as an alternative to the general partner-
ship.121 Before the development of the LLC and the LLP, the
only option for a small business wanting to secure limited lia-
bility was to incorporate and operate as a closely held corpora-
tion."= Because the default rules of the corporate statutes
largely failed to conform to the expectations of small businesses,
many close corporation shareholders experienced significant
problems, especially with freeze-outs.1 The ability of a gener-
al partnership to register as a LLP provides small businesses,
which would have otherwise used a close corporation, the oppor-
tunity to combine partnership business characteristics with
limited liability." 4 Because the LLC's business characteristics
have gravitated more toward the corporate side, the LLP offers a
better choice over the LLC for these small businesses.
The following hypothetical business illustrates how the
technical differences between LLCs and LLPs in Alabama may
significantly impact the participants:
A, B, C, D, and E are all old college friends who decide to
preferred the LLP because, as a form of general partnership, it is more similar to
the partnership form with which they are familiar"). Ribstein and Keatinge have
noted that in some organizations, registration as a LLP is important for the owners
because they want to able to refer to each other as "partners." 1 RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 5, § 2.23.
121. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122. Until the 1990s, the close corporation was the main business organization
choice for small businesses that wanted to obtain limited liability protection. See
CHARLES R. O'KELLEY JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ASSOCIATIONS 359-62 (1992).
123. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 24, at 924-28.
124. See Keatinge, supra note 118, at 208.
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open a video rental and sales store together. A and B agree to
contribute seventy-five percent and twenty-five percent, respec-
tively, of the capital needed for the business, but will not work in
the store. C, D, and E decide to devote their full time to running
the business.
The group agrees to share profits equally, but fails to put the
agreement in writing. Because they are sure that the business
will be successful, they do not discuss losses. The group also de-
cides to designate A as the tax matters partner, but all five own-
ers participate in and vote on other matters affecting the opera-
tion of the business.
In the first three years of operation, due largely to start-up
expenditures, the entity experiences an overall loss. In year four,
the entity breaks even. In years five through seven, the entity
realizes a profit, which increases yearly. Because they feel that
the profitability of the entity is due entirely to their efforts, C, D,
and E become dissatisfied with their profit share in year 8 and
demand that A and B, who have not been contributing services to
the business, take a smaller share of the profits."
There are many problems that may arise if the entity dis-
cussed in the hypothetical were formed as a LLC. The parties'
oral agreement to share profits equally may not be enforceable
because the Alabama LLC Act requires that operating agree-
ments be in writing.2 s If the statutory default profit sharing
ratio applies, C, D, and E, the members who only contributed
services, could be denied any portion of the profits because the
default ratio reflects the percentage of capital contributed. The
capital contributors (A and B) would be entitled to seventy-five
and twenty-five percent of the profits, respectively, an unconscio-
nably harsh result for the service-contributors (C, D, and E). 27
In addition to the potential injustice caused by the statute's
writing requirement, the participants will encounter even bigger
125. Although businesses typically have debt, this hypothetical entity has no debt
in order to simplify the illustration.
126. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (Supp. 1998); see supra notes 91-95 and accompa-
nying text.
127. See id. § 10-12-28 (1994). For additional arguments available to C, D, and
E, see discussion at supra note 94. Under the Alabama LLC statutory default rules,
A and B will initially bear all losses seventy-five and twenty-five percent, respective-
ly, reflecting their capital contribution ratio. C, D, and E can only bear losses if
they have been previously allocated profits while not receiving those profits as distri-
butions. See supra note 94.
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obstacles if they decide to separate from the business following a
disagreement. Disagreements such as the one in the hypothe-
sized situation are not uncommon. The discord results from the
fact that the owners who are actively involved in running the
business often believe that the profits of the business are gener-
ated, for the most part, from their efforts and not from the fi-
nancial investments made by the owners who are not actively
involved in the business."= The owners providing the lion's
share of the financial capital rather than services, of course, will
rarely agree with this view."2
This universal tension between the owners providing most
of the capital and the owners providing most of the services, in
conjunction with Alabama's elimination of dissociation rights
may spell trouble for A and B if they want to remove their capi-
tal from the video store and invest it in another venture. Be-
cause C, D, and E constitute a "corporate majority" on a per
capita basis, those three may be able to suspend all distributions
and authorize salary for themselves while excluding A and B
from receiving any current return on their investment. ° Be-
cause members of Alabama LLCs do not possess dissociation
rights and A and B have not entered into a buy/sell agreement,
A and B (the minority members) from a vote perspective, are
vulnerable to the squeeze-out techniques very commonly seen in
close corporations.'
While the Alabama LLC form proved to be problematic for
the hypothesized business, the LLP form, although not perfect,
will more likely result in consequences that are fair to all five
owners. Under RUPA the oral agreement to share profits equal-
ly will be enforceable, thus protecting the service-contributors
far better than the LLC. Moreover, the default provisions of
RUPA addressing governance and voting provide much better
protection for the capital-contributors who, as a group, possess
128. Gevurtz, supra note 46, at 510 (citing F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, OINEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 2:03 (2d ed. 1995)).
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. Although C, D, and E will
not be able to authorize distributions for themselves while excluding A and B, ar-
guably the decision to authorize salary payments is an ordinary decision, needing
only majority approval on a per capita basis.
131. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-36 (Supp. 1998); see also Gevurtz, supra note 46, at
498-501 (discussing freeze-outs in close corporations).
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less voting strength than the service-contributors. Although the
majority group (C, D, and E) controls all ordinary business deci-
sions of the partnership, C, D, and E must obtain A and B's
consent for all extraordinary business decisions, including the
authorization of salary payments.132 By requiring all five part-
ners to agree to authorize a salary payment or a distribution
that varies from the profit sharing ratio, the LLP statute con-
tains powerful safeguards preventing the squeeze-out techniques
so common among close corporations and now a serious risk for
LLC members.' Because all partners of LLPs have the right
to dissociate, A and B, or any of the other partners who are not
satisfied with their share of the profits, will be able to withdraw
from the partnership.' T Because this partnership is at will, a
partner's withdrawal triggers a dissolution, providing the part-
ners with the right to demand a judicial sale of the partnership
assets. Although the presence of dissociation rights should
encourage the partners to work out their differences rather than
resort to litigation, the judicial sale potential may cause prob-
lems for C, D, and E, the partners least able to economically
compete for the business.3
132. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-401(j) (Supp. 1998); RUPA § 401(j); see supra notes 44-46
and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 46, 51-54 and accompanying text.
134. ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-601, -602 (Supp. 1998); RUPA § 602.
135. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-801(1) (Supp. 1998); RUPA § 801(1).
136. See RUPA §§ 601, 701, 801; see also supra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text (discussing dissolution and judicial sale of partnership). If one partner is
wealthier than the other partners, the opportunity to buy the partnership's assets at
a judicial sale may be of little value to the disadvantaged partner because he cannot
adequately compete for control. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 24, at 915-18 (ex-
plaining how uneven wealth among the partners sometimes resulted in unfair bid-
ding for the business under the UPA rules); id. at 933-34 (arguing that the potential
for abuse due to uneven wealth can be mitigated if dissociation does not result in
dissolution due to statutory valuation standards setting the price rather than the
judicial sale; also arguing that unfairness in the judicial sale process can be mitigat-
ed by expanding the definition of wrongful dissociation). In the hypothetical business,
A, who contributed seventy-five percent of the capital, probably has more economic
resources than any of the other partners, especially those who could only afford to
contribute services. As a result, she could possibly use her economic advantage to




Significant developments in the area of unincorporated
business organizations which offer limited liability have resulted
in great interest in such entities. As a result, the LLC and LLP
have gained prominence among unincorporated business forms.
The LLC and LLP became a choice for doing business in Ala-
bama by acts of the legislature in 1993 and 1996, respectively.
Those two entities were the first instances in which a business
organized in Alabama had the opportunity to effectively operate
as a general partnership with limited liability. Due to the
legislature's recognition of the two entities, Alabama lawyers
electing to organize a business in an unincorporated business
organization offering limited liability now face the task of choos-
ing between the LLC and the LLP which are often difficult to
distinguish. The difficulty in distinguishing between these two
entities stems, in part, from the fact that member-managed
LLCs, many manager-managed LLCs, and LLPs all derive their
most basic roots from the general partnership. Despite the
broad-based similarities of Alabama LLCs and LLPs, the statu-
tory default provisions of the two business forms contain mate-
rial differences that can significantly impact small, unsophisti-
cated businesses that do not engage in careful business plan-
ning.
In the area of management and fiduciary duties, member-
managed LLCs and LLPs enjoy almost complete parity-both
statutes vest substantial management powers in all of the mem-
bers. Additionally, manager-managed LLCs can easily use the
operating agreement to vest management powers with the non-
managing members who will automatically owe commensurate
fiduciary duties. However, the LLC and LLP statutory schemes
for voting on business decisions contain material differences.
These differences are especially apparent in the area of salary
authorization where LLPs require unanimity, while LLCs argu-
ably can authorize salary by mere majority. The area of dissocia-
tion and dissolution is also one in which Alabama LLCs and
LLPs have fundamental differences. Because Alabama has
adopted a version of RUPA, LLP partners are allowed to dissoci-
ate from the partnership at any time. Although the partners
possess the power to eliminate partnership dissolution and a
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judicial sale, the agreement cannot eliminate the power to disso-
ciate and receive payment based on statutory or contractually
defined valuation standards. However, as of January 1, 1998,
Alabama LLC members possess no statutory dissociation rights,
thereby making Alabama LLC members similar to shareholders
of closely held corporations.
LLPs follow the general partnership model for economic
sharing. In absence of a written or oral agreement to the con-
trary, LLP partners share profits equally and losses according to
the profit sharing ratio. In accordance with the limited liability
concept, partners are not required to bear any losses once their
capital account reaches zero. Economic sharing in the LLC is
based upon the limited partnership model rather than the gener-
al partnership model. Unless there is a written agreement stat-
ing otherwise, LLC members are required to share profits and
losses in the same ratio as unreturned capital. The failure of the
Alabama LLC statute to recognize oral agreements can result in
unfair consequences in the area of economic sharing. A member
who contributes a small amount of capital, but relies on an oral
agreement establishing a higher profit sharing ratio than her
capital account may find that the Alabama LLC statute only
entitles her to a share of the profits equal to her capital ratio.
The oral agreement establishing the profit sharing ratio among
the members carries no legal effect unless the LLC member suc-
cessfully invokes equitable remedies.
The choice between the LLC and LLP in Alabama essential-
ly comes down to a consideration of the type of business and the
level of business planning available to the participants. Busi-
nesses needing a centralized management structure that would
otherwise choose a limited partnership will find the LLP unac-
ceptable and therefore should select the manager-managed LLC.
Other businesses contemplating a more flexible management
structure than strict centralized management will find both the
LLC and the LLP to be acceptable choices if the organization of
the business will involve a high level of planning and a very
detailed agreement which covers all aspects of the business.
However, the LLP will be a much better choice if the owners
lack the economic resources to engage in careful business plan-
ning and therefore are unable to obtain the degree of advice
required for a detailed operating agreement. Technical aspects of
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the LLC's default provisions, such as the inability to dissociate,
the arguable ability to authorize salaries by a majority vote, the
requirement of a written operating agreement, and a profit shar-
ing ratio that essentially looks to unreturned capital, are more
likely to negatively affect owners of small, informally run busi-
nesses with fewer economic resources. The LLP provisions, al-
though not perfect, on balance will represent the better choice
for business participants that are unable or unwilling to shoul-
der the transaction costs of a very detailed operating agreement.

